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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,1 the
United States Supreme Court addressed the breadth of electoral process guarantees, which have stood as a bulwark against attempts to
impose extra electoral burdens on discrete minorities. While the
Schuette holding is clear—federal constitutional guarantees are not
necessarily violated by the voters’ amending their state constitution to
preclude the state from affording racial preferences2—the plurality
opinion raises more questions than it answers both with respect to the
particular constitutional doctrine before the Court and with respect to
equal protection jurisprudence more generally. In its haste to reverse
©
*
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the 6th Circuit,3 which had taken the Court at its word,4 the plurality
has now not only left open what electoral process guarantees mean5
and whether they have any force,6 but has also muddled equal protection jurisprudence. Both the ways in which the plurality modified
equal protection jurisprudence, and that it did so sub silentio,7 will
doubtless convince some that the Court is no longer committed to the
fair and equal treatment of the laws. In any event, Schuette is bound
to bring about much confusion in the lower courts until the Court clarifies what it means.8
Part II of this Article discusses several cases in which the Court
developed the electoral process guarantees jurisprudence, concluding
that the jurisprudence was reasonably clear in paradigmatic cases
where extra electoral burdens were placed on racial minorities who
sought the benefits or protections that other groups might seek. Part
III discusses Schuette, focusing on some of the ways that the plurality
mischaracterized the then-existing jurisprudence. The Article concludes that the Schuette plurality not only undermined the electoral
process jurisprudence that it claimed to follow, but misapplied settled
equal protection principles, which will create chaos in the lower courts
unless corrected or clarified.
3. BAMN v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012).
4. Cf. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1667 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The political-process
doctrine . . . resolves this case as a matter of stare decisis.”); id. at 1641 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“The relentless logic of Hunter and Seattle would
point to a similar conclusion in this case. In those cases, one level of government
exercised borrowed authority over an apparently ‘racial issue,’ until a higher
level of government called the loan. So too here.”).
5. Id. at 1641–42 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The plurality . . . disavows the political-process-doctrine basis on which Hunter and Seattle were decided . . . it does not take the next step of overruling those cases. Rather, it
reinterprets them beyond recognition.”); id. at 1664 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I
agree with Justice Scalia that the plurality has rewritten those precedents beyond recognition.”).
6. Id. at 1664 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“And what now of the political-process
doctrine? After the plurality’s revision of Hunter and Seattle, it is unclear what is
left.”).
7. The plurality implied that its holding was consistent with, if not mandated by
past precedent. See id. at 1634 (“The rule that the Court of Appeals elaborated
and respondents seek to establish here would contradict central equal protection
principles.”). But see id. at 1664 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The plurality’s attempt to rewrite Hunter and Seattle so as to cast aside the political-process doctrine sub silentio is impermissible as a matter of stare decisis.”); id. at 1641
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The relentless logic of Hunter and Seattle would point to a similar conclusion in this case.”).
8. Cf. id. at 1654 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Today, by permitting a majority of the
voters in Michigan to do what our Constitution forbids, the Court ends the debate
over race-sensitive admissions policies in Michigan in a manner that contravenes
constitutional protections long recognized in our precedents.”).
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II. ELECTORAL PROCESS GUARANTEES
In a series of cases, the Court has explained some of the electoral
process protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.9 That long-evolving jurisprudence is designed to assure a level playing field so that minorities will not have to
overcome extra electoral burdens when seeking the kinds of benefits
and protections that others seek.10 While the level-playing-field analogy is relatively straightforward, the Court has never adequately explained all aspects of the jurisprudence, for example, which groups are
protected by the guarantees. Instead, the cases in which the guarantees were triggered often involved analyses of the conditions under
which electorates were prohibited from imposing special burdens on
racial minorities, leaving open which groups could successfully invoke
these guarantees to invalidate extra electoral burdens placed upon
them. Up until Schuette was decided, the Court had been content with
providing guidance in the paradigmatic cases with respect to what
counted as electoral burdening and what did not, and then permitting
lower courts to decide other kinds of cases in light of that guidance.
A. Reitman Plants the Seeds
Reitman v. Mulkey11 spelled out some of the elements12 that would
later be central in electoral process guarantees jurisprudence.13 At
issue in Reitman was the constitutionality of Proposition 14, adopted
by referendum, which specified:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease
or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.14
9. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1
(1971); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Crawford v.
L.A. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
10. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Our precedents do not
permit political restructurings that create one process for racial minorities and a
separate, less burdensome process for everyone else.”).
11. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
12. Cf. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1631 (“[T]his Court’s decision in Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967), is a proper beginning point for discussing the controlling
decisions.”).
13. See John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 158 (1993) (discussing a “concern driving the
decisions in Reitman, Hunter, and Washington [that] has to do with obstacles
erected to the full participation of minority groups in the political process”).
14. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 371.
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The referendum nullified existing legislation precluding racial discrimination in the housing market.15 The California Supreme Court
characterized Proposition 14 as having had the “immediate design and
intent . . . ‘to overturn state laws that bore on the right of private
sellers and lessors to discriminate,’ the Unruh and Rumford Acts.”16
While the California court was correct that the amendment nullified
the existing statutory protections, such a result was not in and of itself
constitutionally offensive, because the state does not have an affirmative constitutional obligation to prevent private discrimination. “[T]he
State [is] permitted a neutral position with respect to private racial discriminations and . . . the State [is] not bound by the Federal
Constitution to forbid them.”17 But that means to be constitutionally
offensive, Proposition 14 would have to be construed as non-neutral in
the relevant sense and as effecting more than a mere repeal.18
State neutrality with respect to private discrimination is distinguishable from state promotion of private discrimination, and “a significant state involvement in private discriminations [can] amount to
unconstitutional state action.”19 The California high court reasoned
that “the intent [behind the referendum was] . . . to create a constitutional right to discriminate on racial grounds in the sale and leasing of
real property”20 and, further, that the Proposition was designed “to
forestall future state action that might circumscribe this right.”21 By
forestalling future action that might limit the right to discriminate,
the Proposition was not merely repealing existing law22 but was, in
addition, making it more difficult to reinstate antidiscrimination
protections.
Suppose that the referendum had not amended the California Constitution but instead had merely repealed the laws passed by the legislature. Those in favor of the repealed legislation might have tried to
build coalitions within the legislature and might have again sought to
convince legislators of the wisdom of passing antidiscrimination legislation, perhaps after taking into account some of the objections that
15. See id. at 374 (discussing anti-discrimination statutes passed by the California
Legislature).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 374–75.
18. See Shelby D. Green, Imagining a Right to Housing, Lying in the Interstices, 19
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 393, 423 (2012) (“[T]he [California] court conceded
that the State was permitted to take a neutral position with respect to private
racial discrimination and that the State was not bound by the federal Constitution to forbid private racial discriminatory practices.”).
19. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 375 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961)).
20. Id. at 376.
21. Id. at 374.
22. Id. at 376–77.
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had swayed the electorate to enact a repeal.23 By amending the state
constitution, Proposition 14 precluded those seeking antidiscrimination protections from simply going back to their legislators. Instead,
the state constitution would have to be amended before such protections could be enacted.
A mere repeal of legislation would have been treated in the same
way that the failure to pass that legislation in the first place would
have been treated.24 The California high court “did not posit a constitutional violation on the mere repeal of the Unruh and Rumford
Acts.”25 It was the additional elements that made Proposition 14 constitutionally offensive, because the referendum “would and did have
wider impact than a mere repeal of existing statutes.”26 In addition,
the “right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial
grounds, was now embodied in the State’s basic charter, immune from
legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state
government.”27 The Reitman Court noted that the challenged proposition “authorize[d] racial discrimination in the housing market. [Thus]
[t]he right to discriminate . . . [became] one of the basic policies of the
State.”28 Because there were “no persuasive considerations indicating
that [the California Supreme Court’s] judgments should be overturned,”29 the United States Supreme Court deferred to the California
high court’s determination that the referendum’s passage “will significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations.”30
The Court’s deference on that point was important. States are constitutionally prohibited from supporting private discrimination,31 so the
United States Supreme Court’s deference with respect to the determination that the amendment would encourage private discrimination
provided the basis for the Court’s affirmance of the California Supreme Court’s striking down Proposition 14 as a violation of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.32
23. Cf. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53
B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1437 n.54 (2012) (discussing “the ‘Mrs. Murphy exemption,’
which exempts dwellings with four or fewer families, if one of them is the
owner’s,” from housing antidiscrimination restrictions).
24. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 389 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 376.
26. Id. at 376–77.
27. Id. at 377.
28. Id. at 381.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 375 (“[A] significant state involvement in private discriminations could
amount to unconstitutional state action.”) (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
32. See id. at 375–76 (“The judgment of the California court was that § 26 unconstitutionally involves the State in racial discriminations and is therefore invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”;) id. at 381 (“Affirmed.”).
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The Reitman Court did not even attempt to perform “the ‘impossible task’ of formulating an infallible test for determining whether the
State ‘in any of its manifestations’ has become significantly involved
in private discriminations.”33 Instead, it noted that “ ‘[o]nly by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances’ on a case-by-case basis can a ‘nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its
true significance,’ ”34 although in this case it was not necessary for the
Court itself to do that sifting and weighing because the California Supreme Court had already done that. The latter court, “armed as it was
with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact of § 26, and familiar with the milieu in
which that provision would operate, has determined that the provision
would involve the State in private racial discriminations to an unconstitutional degree.”35 The United States Supreme Court deferred to
the California Supreme Court with respect to the degree to which the
amendment encouraged private discrimination, although the decision
to defer was itself controversial.36
In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the California “repeal of
its prior statutes forbidding private discrimination”37 should not be
treated any differently than would “California’s failure to pass any
such antidiscrimination statutes in the first instance.”38 Yet, Proposition 14 was not a mere statutory repeal, because “the State’s basic
charter”39 had been amended. But even granting that the proposition
at issue involved more than a mere statutory repeal, Justice Harlan
argued that the “Fourteenth Amendment does not reach such state
constitutional action [i.e., amending the state constitution to insulate
private discrimination] any more than it does a simple legislative repeal of legislation forbidding private discrimination.”40 His belief that
modifying the state constitution in this way was permissible was due
to his rejecting that the proposition would encourage or promote discrimination. First, he noted:
The only “factual” matter relied on by the majority of the California Supreme
Court [when concluding that the amendment would promote discrimination]
was the context in which Proposition 14 was adopted, namely, that several
strong antidiscrimination acts had been passed by the legislature and opposed
by many of those who successfully led the movement for adoption of Proposition 14 by popular referendum.41
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 378 (citing Burton, 365 U.S. at, 722).
Id. (citing Burton, 365 U.S. at 722).
See id. at 378–79.
Id. at 390–91 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 377 (majority opinion).
Id. at 389 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
Id. at 391.
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He also explained that the California high court’s conclusion that
the proposition would encourage discrimination was not based on the
trial court’s findings.42 The same point was made about the conclusion that the intent behind the proposition was to promote discrimination.43 Thus, because Justice Harlan rejected that the state itself was
promoting discrimination, he rejected that the California amendment
was unconstitutional.44
In the electoral process guarantees jurisprudence, certain features
of Reitman are emphasized while others are irrelevant. A key consideration is whether the contested action is more than a mere repeal in
the sense that the disadvantaged group now has a greater electoral
burden than do other groups when seeking to obtain advantages or
protections.45 However, the discussion in Reitman about whether the
state is encouraging private discrimination by virtue of its having
modified the law has not played a similar role in the subsequent cases
informing this jurisprudence.46
B. The Jurisprudence Is Clarified
The Court made clear which elements of Reitman would be incorporated into the electoral process guarantees jurisprudence when it
decided Hunter v. Erickson.47 At issue in Hunter was whether an Akron referendum “amending the city charter to prevent the city council
from implementing any ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing without the approval of the majority
of the voters of Akron”48 was unconstitutional in light of Reitman
guarantees. The Akron referendum had taken place after the City
Council had “enacted a fair housing ordinance premised on a recognition of the social and economic losses to society which flow from substandard, ghetto housing and its tendency to breed discrimination and
segregation.”49 The referendum, which passed by majority vote, made
42. See id. at 390 (“There were no findings as to the general effect of § 26.”).
43. Id. (“The Court declares that the California court held the intent of § 26 was to
authorize private racial discriminations in the housing market . . . , but there is
no supporting fact in the record for this characterization.” (citation omitted)).
44. See id. at 395 (“I believe the state action required to bring the Fourteenth Amendment into operation must be affirmative and purposeful, actively fostering discrimination. Only in such a case is ostensibly ‘private’ action more properly
labeled ‘official.’ I do not believe that the mere enactment of § 26, on the showing
made here, falls within this class of cases.”).
45. See infra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 52–71 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 207–11 and
accompanying text (discussing the Schuette plurality alluding to Harlan’s Reitman dissent).
47. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
48. Id. at 386.
49. Id.
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the City Council housing antidiscrimination laws ineffective unless
ratified by the Akron electorate.50
The City of Akron distinguished its referendum from the unconstitutional referendum at issue in Reitman by noting that “the city charter declares no right to discriminate in housing, authorizes and
encourages no housing discrimination, and places no ban on the enactment of fair housing ordinances.”51 Thus, if Reitman were understood
to invalidate only those referenda creating a right to discriminate or
only those referenda construed as placing a state imprimatur on discrimination, then the Akron ordinance would seem to pass muster.
Or, if Reitman were understood to preclude outright bans on antidiscrimination legislation but not to preclude merely making it somewhat harder for minorities to achieve desired goals, then Reitman
would be inapplicable to the Akron referendum’s constitutionality.
However, the differences between the California and Akron referenda
emphasized by the City of Akron did not immunize the Akron amendment from invalidation under Reitman.
While the Akron referendum did not place an outright ban on antidiscrimination measures, it nonetheless imposed a burden on certain
minorities that other groups seeking benefits or protections did not
also have to bear. The referendum measure “not only suspended the
operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination,
but also required the approval of the electors before any future ordinance could take effect.”52 By requiring subsequent ratification by the
electorate for certain measures but not others, the referendum measure “drew a distinction between those groups who sought the law’s
protection against racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations in the
sale and rental of real estate and those who sought to regulate real
property transactions in the pursuit of other ends.”53 Because the referendum imposed this additional condition for certain antidiscrimination measures, the Court rejected that the Akron referendum was a
mere repeal of the antidiscrimination ordinance.54
50. See id. at 387 (“Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which
regulates the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property of any kind or of any interest therein on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by
a majority of the electors voting on the question at a regular or general election
before said ordinance shall be effective. Any such ordinance in effect at the time
of the adoption of this section shall cease to be effective until approved by the
electors as provided herein.” (quoting Akron City Charter § 137)).
51. Id. at 389.
52. Id. at 389–90.
53. Id. at 390.
54. Id. at 390 n.5 (“Thus we do not hold that mere repeal of an existing ordinance
violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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When analyzing the referendum, the Court made two distinct
points. First, the referendum subjected legislation affecting certain
groups to a more demanding procedure when those groups sought to
effect change. “Only laws to end housing discrimination based on
‘race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry’ must run § 137’s
gantlet.”55 Such laws might be contrasted with other laws that the
City Council might pass. “The automatic referendum system does not
reach housing discrimination on sexual or political grounds, or against
those with children or dogs, nor does it affect tenants seeking more
heat or better maintenance from landlords, nor those seeking rent
control, urban renewal, public housing, or new building codes.”56 It
was at least in part because the Akron electorate distinguished among
the types of referenda requiring ratification that the referendum was
constitutionally suspect.57
Yet, legislation by its very nature distinguishes among groups or
categories, subjecting some to regulations to which others are not subject,58 so the mere fact that some categories or groups are comparatively disadvantaged does not establish that legislation is
constitutional infirm.59 The reason that Akron’s referendum was unconstitutional was due to the types of groups chosen to bear this
greater electoral burden.60
Two distinct points might be made about the categories chosen to
bear this increased electoral burden. First, the classifications themselves might provide reason for the Court to look at the Proposition
with “with skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye”61—each of the classifications would currently be recognized as triggering strict scrutiny.62
Second, not only were suspect classifications being targeted, but the
55. Id. at 390.
56. Id. at 391.
57. See id. at 392–93 (“Akron might have proceeded by majority vote at town meeting
on all its municipal legislation”).
58. See Denise G. Reaume, Discrimination and Dignity, 63 LA. L. REV. 645, 651
(2003) (“[E]very piece of legislation has some impact which leaves some better off
than others (just as all legislation distinguishes between classes of persons).”).
59. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966) (internal citations omitted)
(“[W]e are guided by the familiar principles that a statute is not invalid under the
Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did, that a legislature
need not strike at all evils at the same time, and that reform may take one step at
a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to
the legislative mind.”).
60. See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
61. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994).
62. See Robert I. Berdon, Connecticut Equal Protection Clause: Requirement of Strict
Scrutiny When Classifications Are Based upon Sex, Physical Disability or Mental
Disability, 64 CONN. B.J. 386, 391 (1990) (“[R]eligion, race, color, ancestry and
national origin are not generally believed to require under the federal constitution this most exacting judicial review of strict scrutiny.”).
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Court was confident that it understood who would bear the brunt of
the burdens imposed.
The Court recognized that Akron had not made any formal distinctions within the categories picked out for this special burden. “It is
true that the section draws no distinctions among racial and religious
groups. Negroes and whites, Jews and Catholics are all subject to the
same requirements if there is housing discrimination against them
which they wish to end.”63 However, this formal equality did not immunize the referendum measure from further review. “[A]lthough the
law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical
manner, the reality is that the law’s impact falls on the minority. The
majority needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a
referendum might be bothersome but no more than that.”64 The
Hunter Court held that the ordinance “discriminates against minorities, and constitutes a real, substantial, and invidious denial of the
equal protection of the laws.”65
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan recognized that the provision at
issue “has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their interest.”66 Because the “charter amendment is discriminatory on its
face, Akron must ‘bear a far heavier burden of justification’ than is
required in the normal case.”67
Justice Harlan was making two distinct points. One involved the
purpose behind the legislation, namely, to make it more difficult for
minorities to promote their own interests.68 Here, he was presumably
following the majority’s conclusion that the ordinance “discriminates
against minorities, and constitutes a real, substantial, and invidious
denial of the equal protection of the laws.”69 For present purposes,
though, the more important issue is why he thought the “charter
amendment . . . [was] discriminatory on its face”70 when the amendment did not state that it applied to only certain races or religions but,
instead, simply included those general categories. The majority provided that answer as well when noting that “there was an explicitly
racial classification treating racial housing matters differently from
other . . . housing matters.”71 The facial discrimination involved expressly focusing on the category of race rather than on expressly focusing on a particular race.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 (1969).
Id. at 391.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964)).
Id.
Id. at 393 (majority opinion).
Id. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 389 (majority opinion).
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The Schuette plurality suggested that “Hunter rests on the unremarkable principle that the State may not alter the procedures of
government to target racial minorities.”72 Yet, it is important to discuss the ways in which government procedures in Hunter targeted minorities. The referendum precluded the City Council from according
protections to individuals within certain categories (including race)
absent ratification by the local electorate. There was no evidence that
the city itself was discriminating; rather, the “widespread racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing, [which] led to segregated housing, forcing many to live in ‘unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary
and overcrowded conditions’ ”73 was private.74 The City Council was
passing antidiscrimination legislation to preclude private individuals
from so acting and, indeed, Hunter had claimed that she had not been
shown particular houses for sale because the owners had specified
that they did not want their house to be shown to someone of Mrs.
Hunter’s race.75 It was thus surprising for the Schuette plurality to
suggest that in Hunter “there was a demonstrated injury on the basis
of race that, by reasons of state encouragement or participation, became more aggravated.”76 There was nothing in Hunter suggesting
that the amendment somehow encouraged Akron citizens to discriminate. The injury was not in the state’s causing private individuals to
discriminate nor even in permitting individuals to discriminate by virtue of having repealed the antidiscrimination provision, since a mere
repeal would have been constitutional.77 Instead, the injury imposed
by the state in Hunter was in having “disadvantage[d] . . . [a] particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf.”78 Indeed, the Hunter Court noted that the electorate could
simply have repealed the Council measure,79 but instead chose to add
an additional hurdle by requiring additional ratification of certain antidiscrimination measures.80
72. Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632 (2014).
73. Id. (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
74. See Gail Heriot, The Parade of Horribles Lives: Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, Integration, and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by
Any Means Necessary, 14 ENGAGE 14, 16 (2013) (discussing “Akron’s efforts to
discourage racial discrimination by private citizens”).
75. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387 (“[O]n meeting Mrs. Hunter the agent ‘stated that
she could not show me any of the houses on the list she had prepared for me
because all of the owners had specified they did not wish their houses shown to
[N]egroes.’”).
76. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1624 (emphasis added).
77. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390 n.5 (“[W]e do not hold that mere repeal of an existing
ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
78. Id. at 393.
79. See id. at 390 n.6 (noting that “the city charter may be amended or measures
enacted by the council repealed through a referendum which may be obtained on
petition of 10% of the voters”).
80. Id. at 390.
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C. Referenda Not Targeting Minorities
Hunter does not entail that all referenda will be examined with
close scrutiny whenever imposing electoral burdens.81 In James v.
Valtierra,82 the Court suggested some of the relevant considerations
to determine the constitutionality of referenda, although a little background is helpful to understand the decision. Federal law created a
housing agency to give state agencies loans and grants “for slum clearance and low-rent housing projects.”83 To take advantage of the opportunity created by that legislation, the California Legislature
created a housing authority in each city and county “to take advantage
of the financing made available by the federal Housing Act.”84 At this
time, the California Constitution already “reserved to the State’s people the power to initiate legislation and to reject or approve by referendum any Act passed by the state legislature.”85
In 1950, the California Supreme Court held that local decisions to
seek federal housing aid “were ‘executive’ and ‘administrative,’ not
‘legislative,’ and therefore the state constitution’s referendum provisions did not apply to these actions.”86 Within half a year, “the California voters adopted Article XXXIV of the state constitution to bring
public housing decisions under the State’s referendum policy . . . provid[ing] that no low-rent housing project should be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by a state public body
until the project was approved by a majority of those voting at a community election.”87 Basically, this provision imposed a ratification
condition before a local decision to develop, construct, or acquire lowcost housing could be implemented.
Citizens in two California localities (the city of San Jose and San
Mateo County) challenged the referendum amending the state constitution.88 In those localities, “housing authorities could not apply for
federal funds because low-cost housing proposals had been defeated in
referendums.”89 The district court struck down the amendment,90 re81. See Note, Required Referendum for Low-Income Housing, 85 HARV. L. REV. 122,
124–25 (1971) (“Although the majority [in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971)] seemed to concede that Article 34 [a referendum] disadvantages the California poor, this impact was viewed as a constitutionally unobjectionable byproduct of a salutary vehicle for popular decisionmaking.”).
82. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
83. Id. at 138.
84. Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34240 (1951)).
85. Id. (citing CAL. CONST., Art. IV, § 1).
86. Id. (citing Hous. Auth. for City of Eureka v. Superior Court, 219 P.2d 457, 460–61
(Cal. 1950)).
87. Id. at 139.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 140 (“The first paragraph in the District Court’s decision stated simply: ‘We
hold Article XXXIV to be unconstitutional.’ ”).
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lying heavily upon Hunter.91 The James Court distinguished what
was at issue before the Hunter Court and what was at issue in the
instant case. The Court noted that “[u]nlike the Akron referendum
provision, it cannot be said that California’s Article XXXIV rests on
‘distinctions based on race,’ ”92 because the “referendum requires [ratification] for any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects
which will be occupied by a racial minority.”93 Of course, facial neutrality does not establish the absence of invidious intent, but there
was insufficient evidence in the record to “support any claim that a
law seemingly neutral on its face [was] in fact aimed at a racial
minority.”94
Even if the law was not directed at burdening a minority,95 it was
nonetheless true that the amendment imposed a greater burden on
those seeking low-cost public housing than on those seeking other
goods.96 However, the Court noted that “a lawmaking procedure that
‘disadvantages’ a particular group does not always deny equal protection.”97 Otherwise, “a State would not be able to require referendums
on any subject unless referendums were required on all, because they
would always disadvantage some group.”98 Nor could it be claimed
that this was the only issue subject to referendum approval.99
The Court further worried that an extension of Hunter100 might
force the Court “to analyze governmental structures to determine
whether a . . . rule is likely to ‘disadvantage’ any of the diverse and
91. Id. (“While the District Court cited several cases of this Court, its chief reliance
plainly rested on Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).”).
92. Id. at 141 (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)); see also Note, supra note
81, at 124–25 (“[I]n Valtierra, no racial impact was apparent on the face of the
law, and the record yielded insufficient evidence that the California referendum
in fact operated to burden blacks.”).
95. But see James, 402 U.S. at 144 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The article explicitly
singles out low-income persons to bear its burden.”).
96. Id. at 142 (“[A]ppellees . . . suggest that the mandatory nature of the Article
XXXIV referendum constitutes unconstitutional discrimination because it hampers persons desiring public housing from achieving their objective when no such
roadblock faces other groups seeking to influence other public decisions to their
advantage.”).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (“[A]n examination of California law reveals that persons advocating low-income housing have not been singled out for mandatory referendums while no
other group must face that obstacle. Mandatory referendums are required for
approval of state constitutional amendments, for the issuance of general obligation long-term bonds by local governments, and for certain municipal territorial
annexations.”).
100. See id. at 141 (“The present case could be affirmed only by extending Hunter, and
this we decline to do.”).
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shifting groups that make up the American people.”101 Such a comment suggests that the Court was reluctant to extend the electoral
guarantees to “diverse and shifting groups,”102 perhaps because the
malleability of the group would mean that individuals burdened at
one point in time might not be burdened at a later point in time, since
they would no longer be part of the group bearing the burden. But if
indeed individuals could exit the class, then that would mean that the
burdens borne by particular individuals might be less severe than
would otherwise be thought—sometimes, the class burdened by a particular classification would be composed of certain individuals,
whereas at other times it would be composed of different
individuals.103
The Court’s focus on the malleability of targeted groups was also
addressed in Gordon v. Lance.104 At issue was a constitutional and
statutory requirement in West Virginia that “political subdivisions of
the State may not incur bonded indebtedness or increase tax rates beyond those established by the Constitution without the approval of
60% of the voters in a referendum election.”105 The case arose because the Roane County Board of Education sought voter approval of a
bond issue and a tax levy “to support current expenditures and capital
improvements.”106 While both measures received majority approval,107 neither measure garnered the 60% vote necessary for
enactment.108
Citizens who had voted in favor of the proposals challenged the
60% requirement as a violation of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.109 Their complaint was not only based on the recent election results alone but on similar results on a number of occasions—there had
101. Id. at 142.
102. Id.
103. A separate issue involves how easy it is for individuals to escape their economic
class. Cf. Nicholas D. Kristof, Now It’s the Canadian Dream: Let’s Make America
the Land of Opportunity Again, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, at A13, May 20, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 13483483 (“ ‘Equality of opportunity—the “American
Dream”—has always been a cherished American ideal,’ Joseph Stiglitz, the
Nobel-winning economist at Columbia University, noted in a recent speech. ‘But
data now show that this is a myth: America has become the advanced country not
only with the highest level of inequality, but one of those with the least equality
of opportunity.’ ”).
104. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id. at 3.
107. See id. (“Of the total votes cast, 51.55% favored the bond issues and 51.51% favored the tax levy.”).
108. See id. (“Having failed to obtain the requisite 60% affirmative vote, the proposals
were declared defeated.”).
109. See id. (“Respondents then brought this action, seeking a declaratory judgment
that the 60% requirements were unconstitutional as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
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been several votes in which a majority of the electorate had approved
funding for education improvements but in each case the required
60% vote had not been reached.110 The West Virginia Supreme Court
had held that the 60% requirement violated equal protection guarantees, because it in effect diluted the voting power of those in favor the
measure.111
When analyzing whether the West Virginia Supreme Court had
correctly applied the law, the United States Supreme Court noted that
the “West Virginia Constitution singles out no ‘discrete and insular
minority’ for special treatment. The three-fifths requirement applied
equally to all bond issues for any purpose, whether for schools, sewers,
or highways.”112 The Court explained that “any departure from strict
majority rule gives disproportionate power to the minority,”113 but
that “there is nothing in the language of the Constitution, our history,
or our cases that requires that a majority always prevail on every issue.”114 As long as voting provisions “do not discriminate against or
authorize discrimination against any identifiable class they do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.”115 Together, James and Gordon
suggest that electoral process guarantees may be inapplicable when
the groups targeted are not discrete and insular.116
D. Dueling Cases Help Establish Which Considerations Are
Key in the Jurisprudence
Washington v. Seattle School District117 and Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education118 are helpfully contrasted, because each helps
110. See id. (“They further alleged that four similar proposals had been previously
defeated, although each had received majorities of affirmative votes ranging from
52.51% to 55.84%.”).
111. See id. (“On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the state constitutional and statutory 60% requirements violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Lance v. Bd. of
Educ. of Cnty. of Roane, 170 S.E.2d 783 (W. Va. 1969))); see also id. at 4 (“The
court below relied heavily on two of our holdings dealing with limitations on the
right to vote and dilution of voting power.”).
112. Id. at 5.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Cf. Mark Strasser, From Colorado to Alaska by Way of Cincinnati: On Romer,
Equality Foundation, and the Constitutionality of Referenda, 36 HOUS. L. REV.
1193, 1211 (1999) (“The Gordon Court said that it would uphold the provision not
because it could not identify a particular racial group that would be disadvantaged, but because no independently identifiable group would be disadvantaged.
Thus, the better interpretation of the Hunter line of cases, including James, is
that referenda which specifically target an identifiable group for adverse treatment will not pass constitutional muster.”).
117. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
118. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).

2015]

ELECTORAL PROCESS GUARANTEES

75

establish the importance in the jurisprudence of the state’s targeting
identifiable minorities. Seattle involved a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to a statewide initiative providing that “no school
board . . . shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend a
school other than the school which is geographically nearest or next
nearest the student’s place of residence . . . and which offers the course
of study pursued by such student . . . .”119 However, the initiative
included a number of exceptions, for example, when the student had
special needs or when the nearby school was overcrowded or
unsafe.120
The district court found that the purpose behind the initiative was
to prevent busing to achieve racial desegregation.121 The campaign in
favor of the proposition “focused almost exclusively on the wisdom of
‘forced busing’ for integration.”122 While the district court found that
“racial bias . . . [was] a factor in the opposition to the ‘busing’ of students to obtain racial balance,”123 the court also found that voters supported the initiative “for ‘a number of reasons,’ so that ‘[i]t [was]
impossible to ascertain all of those reasons [o]r to determine the relative impact of those reasons upon the electorate.’ ”124 The district
court struck down the initiative.125
When reviewing whether the initiative violated equal protection
guarantees, the Seattle Court noted that “the political majority may
generally restructure the political process to place obstacles in the
path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental action.”126 However, “a different analysis is required when the State
allocates governmental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process.”127
Here, the Court discussed the racial nature of the initiative because it
understood that the initiative was designed to prevent busing as a
119. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 462 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010 (1981)).
120. Id. (“The initiative then set out, however, a number of broad exceptions to this
requirement: a student may be assigned beyond his neighborhood school if he
‘requires special education, care or guidance,’ or if ‘there are health or safety
hazards, either natural or man made, or physical barriers or obstacles . . . between the student’s place of residence and the nearest or next nearest school,’ or
if ‘the school nearest or next nearest to his place of residence is unfit or inadequate because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities.’ ”).
121. Id. at 463 (“At the same time, however, the court’s findings demonstrate that the
initiative was directed solely at desegregative busing in general, and at the Seattle Plan in particular.”).
122. Id. (citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. 996, 1009 (W.D.
Wash. 1979)).
123. Id. at 465 (citing Seattle, 473 F. Supp. at 1009).
124. Id. (citing Seattle, 473 F. Supp. at 1010).
125. See id. (noting that the district court then held Initiative 350 unconstitutional for
three independent reasons).
126. Id. at 470.
127. Id.
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means of promoting racial integration of the schools, notwithstanding
the initiative’s facial neutrality in that it never expressly mentioned
race.128
The Seattle Court explained that “[s]tate action of this
kind . . . ‘places special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process.’ ”129 Because the placement of such burdens “mak[es]
it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities [than for
other members of the community] to achieve legislation that is in their
interest,”130 that kind of “structuring of the political process . . . [is]
‘no more permissible than [is] denying [members of a racial minority]
the vote, on an equal basis with others.’ ”131 The initiative at issue
was unconstitutional because “it use[d] the racial nature of an issue to
define the governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus impose[d] substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.”132
The supporters of the initiative claimed that it was racially neutral, “because the initiative simply permit[ted] busing for certain enumerated purposes while neutrally forbidding it for all other
reasons.”133 But the Court found such a contention unpersuasive,134
“for despite its facial neutrality there is little doubt that the initiative
was effectively drawn for racial purposes.”135 The Court was also not
persuaded that the initiative was neutral with respect to its allocation
of burdens. “[D]esegregation of the public schools, like the Akron open
housing ordinance, at bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the
minority, and is designed for that purpose.”136 The “initiative
removes the authority to address a racial problem—and only a racial
problem—from the existing decisionmaking body, in such a way as to
burden minority interests.”137 Unlike other kinds of student assignment decisions which remained a matter of local control,138 individuals “favoring the elimination of de facto school segregation now must
seek relief from the state legislature, or from the statewide electorate.”139 Thus, before the adoption of the initiative, certain student
128. See id. at 471 (“Initiative 350 nowhere mentions ‘race’ or ‘integration’ . . . .
[D]espite its facial neutrality there is little doubt that the initiative was effectively drawn for racial purposes.”).
129. Id. at 470 (citing Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
130. Id. (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 (Hunter, J., concurring)).
131. Id. (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391) (majority opinion).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 471.
134. See id. (“We find it difficult to believe that appellants’ analysis is seriously
advanced.”).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 472.
137. Id. at 474.
138. Id. (“Yet authority over all other student assignment decisions, as well as over
most other areas of educational policy, remains vested in the local school board.”).
139. Id.
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assignment decisions were made on a local level, but after the initiative they would have to be made on the state level.140 While reaffirming that the mere repeal of a law or policy was not enough to implicate
Fourteenth Amendment concerns,141 the Seattle Court explained that
the referendum “works something more than the ‘mere repeal’ of a
desegregation law by the political entity that created it.”142 The initiative “burdens all future attempts to integrate Washington schools in
districts throughout the State, by lodging decisionmaking authority
over the question at a new and remote level of government.”143
The Court had no doubt that the initiative at issue was both intended to and did impose burdens on the basis of race. “[W]hen the
political process or the decisionmaking mechanism used to address racially conscious legislation—and only such legislation—is singled out
for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action
plainly ‘rests on distinctions based on race.’ ”144 But the Court
reached a very different conclusion about whether race was the focus
of the referendum at issue in Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of
Education.145
Crawford involved a challenge to a state constitutional amendment providing that “state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or transportation unless a federal court would do so to
remedy a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”146 Although this meant that busing to achieve goals of
racial integration could not be used as extensively post-referendum as
it had been used pre-referendum,147 the Crawford Court “reject[ed]
the contention that once a State chooses to do ‘more’ than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede.”148 Such an “interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [would be] destructive of
140. Id. at 479–80 (“Before adoption of the initiative, the power to determine what
programs would most appropriately fill a school district’s educational needs—including programs involving student assignment and desegregation—was firmly
committed to the local board’s discretion.”).
141. Id. at 483 (“To be sure, ‘the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or
antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a
presumptively invalid racial classification.’ ” (citing Crawford v. L.A. Bd. of Educ.,
458 U.S. 527, 539 (1982))).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 485 (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
145. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
146. Id. at 529.
147. A not entirely successful busing plan had been implemented prior to the adoption
of the referendum. See id. at 531 (“[T]he trial court . . . ultimately approved a
second plan that included substantial mandatory school reassignment and transportation—“busing”—on a racial and ethnic basis. The plan was put into effect in
the fall of 1978, but after one year’s experience, all parties to the litigation were
dissatisfied.”).
148. Id. at 535.
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a State’s democratic processes and of its ability to experiment.”149
Adoption of the amendment did not alter the obligation of state courts
“under state law to order segregated school districts to use voluntary
desegregation techniques, whether or not there has been a finding of
intentional segregation.”150 Nor did it override the obligation of the
school districts themselves “to take reasonably feasible steps to
desegregate.”151
The petitioners argued that the amendment was facially unconstitutional because it “employs an ‘explicit racial classification’ and imposes a ‘race-specific’ burden on minorities seeking to vindicate statecreated rights.”152 They noted that “other state-created rights may be
vindicated by the state courts without limitation on remedies.”153
While the Court agreed that if the Proposition had “employed a racial
classification it would be unconstitutional unless necessary to further
a compelling state interest,”154 the Court denied that the measure at
issue classified on the basis of race.155 Because the Proposition
“neither says nor implies that persons are to be treated differently on
account of their race,”156 the Court interpreted the proposition to be
neutrally “forbid[ding] state courts to order pupil school assignment or
transportation in the absence of a Fourteenth Amendment
violation.”157
Not only did the Court reject that the proposition was of a racial
nature, but it also rejected that the proposition was “enacted with a
discriminatory purpose,”158 instead accepting that the voters were
likely motivated by the “the educational benefits of neighborhood
schooling.”159 Finally, the Court even expressed its uncertainty about
which groups would be adversely affected by the measure.160 But its
decision was not predicated on uncertainty regarding the measure’s
effects, since even were the measure to have a discriminatory impact
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 535–36.
Id. at 536.
Id.
Id. at 536–37.
See id. at 537 (“But Proposition I does not embody a racial classification.”).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 543; see also id. at 545 (“Even if we could assume that Proposition I had a
disproportionate adverse effect on racial minorities, we see no reason to challenge
the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the voters of the State were not motivated
by a discriminatory purpose.”).
159. Id. at 543.
160. See id. at 537 (“[E]ven if Proposition I had a racially discriminatory effect, in view
of the demographic mix of the District it is not clear which race or races would be
affected the most or in what way.”).
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upon a racial minority, there at most would have been a showing of
disparate impact without a showing of invidious intent.161
Perhaps Seattle and Crawford should have been decided the same
way, because they both involved electoral restrictions on busing as a
method of achieving racial integration in the schools.162 For purposes
here, the important point involves how the Court differentiated between the two cases. While neither case involved a referendum expressly distinguishing on the basis of race,163 one but not the other
was construed as being of a racial nature.164 Further, the Crawford
Court expressly noted that if the Proposition had employed a racial
classification, strict scrutiny would have been triggered.165 Thus, Seattle and Crawford both suggest that where a proposition expressly or
impliedly imposes an extra electoral burden on the basis of race, it will
be struck down unless it passes strict scrutiny.166
E. An Apparent (but Not Actual) Electoral Process
Guarantees Case?
Romer v. Evans167 would seem to be a good candidate for an electoral process guarantees analysis,168 if only because the Colorado Supreme Court had struck down the referendum at issue in that case as
a violation of Fourteenth Amendment electoral process rights.169 The
referendum, whose passage amended the Colorado Constitution,
stated:
161. See id. at 537–38 (“[E]ven when a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse
effect on a racial minority, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discriminatory purpose can be shown.”).
162. Id. at 548 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Because I fail to see how a fundamental
redefinition of the governmental decisionmaking structure with respect to the
same racial issue can be unconstitutional when the State seeks to remove the
authority from local school boards, yet constitutional when the State attempts to
achieve the same result by limiting the power of its courts, I must dissent from
the Court’s decision to uphold Proposition I.”).
163. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (discussing the
proposition’s “facial neutrality”); Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537 (“Proposition I does
not embody a racial classification.”).
164. Compare Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470 (deciding that the initiative created unconstitutional distinctions based on racial classifications), with Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537
(upholding an amendment found not employ racial classifications).
165. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 536–37.
166. Id.; Seattle, 458 U.S. at 471.
167. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
168. See Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1670 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing it as “involving discriminatory restructurings of the political process . . . also
worthy of mention”).
169. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994), aff’d on other grounds, Romer,
517 U.S. 620 (striking Amendment 2 because it “den[ied] the right of an identifiable group (who may or may not engage in homosexual sodomy) to participate
equally in the political process”).
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Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person
or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution
shall be in all respects self-executing.170

At the time the referendum was passed, three municipalities already
prohibited orientation discrimination.171 The Romer Court explained:
“The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific
legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.”172
The Amendment reached both state and private action. “Not confined to the private sphere, Amendment 2 also operates to repeal and
forbid all laws or policies providing specific protection for gays or lesbians from discrimination by every level of Colorado government.”173
Precluding the enactment of protective legislation on all levels of
government for one particular group would seem to be exactly the
kind of harm that electoral process guarantees seek to prevent. Presumably, this is why the Colorado Supreme Court struck down the
amendment as a violation of Fourteenth Amendment electoral process
guarantees.174 That court noted, “prior to the passage of this amendment, gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals were, of course, free to appeal
to state and local government for protection against discrimination
based on their sexual orientation.”175 After the passage of Amendment 2, however, “the sole political avenue by which this class could
seek such protection would be through the constitutional amendment
process.”176
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the Colorado Supreme Court that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional,177 although
not because of electoral process guarantees. Instead, the Court discussed rational basis review, explaining that “if a law neither burdens
a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end.”178 But, the Court suggested, Amendment 2 could not
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
See id. at 626.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 629.
Evans, 854 P.2d at 1285 (“Amendment 2 singles out and prohibits this class of
persons from seeking governmental action favorable to it and thus, from participating equally in the political process.”).
Id. at 1286.
Id.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36 (“Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause,
and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is affirmed.”).
Id. at 631.
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even pass this deferential standard.179 Not only did the measure have
“the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group,”180 but its “sheer breadth [was] so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment
seem[ed] inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affect[ed]; it lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests.”181
By holding that the Amendment 2 failed to pass rational basis review, the Court did not need to address other issues, for example,
whether statutes targeting sexual orientation trigger closer constitutional scrutiny.182 Nor did it need to address whether the Colorado
Supreme Court was correct that the amendment violated electoral
process guarantees.183 By “affirm[ing] the judgment, but on a rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court,”184 the
Court left open whether the Colorado Supreme Court’s rationale was
also correct or, instead, was incorrect. So, too, for example, when the
Court held in Lawrence v. Texas that the state’s same-sex sodomy prohibition violated due process guarantees;185 the Court did not thereby
preclude that the statute might have been challenged successfully on
equal protection grounds as well.186
Up until Schuette, the electoral process guarantees jurisprudence
incorporated the following rule: A state cannot impose additional electoral burdens on minorities insofar as they wish to secure benefits or
179.
180.
181.
182.

183.

184.
185.

186.

Id. at 632 (“Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.”).
Id.
Id.
Cf. Catherine Jean Archibald, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Right: Implications of
the Sex Discrimination Present in Same-Sex Marriage Exclusions for the Next Supreme Court Same-Sex Marriage Case, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 8 n.28 (2013) (“The
Supreme Court is not precluded by its prior cases from finding that sexual orientation discrimination merits heightened scrutiny.”); Steven G. Calabresi &
Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1054 n.445 (2013) (“Although Romer ostensibly applied rational basis review, commentators widely agree that the Court
in fact applied, without acknowledging that it was doing so, a developing form of
heightened scrutiny that applies to sexual orientation-based classifications.”).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 625 (“[T]he State Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 was
subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringed
the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political
process.”).
Id. at 626.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The case does involve two adults
who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices
common to a homosexual lifestyle. . . . Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.”).
See id. at 574–75 (“[C]ounsel for the petitioners and some amici contend that
Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument.”).
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protections.187 There was some question as to which groups were protected under this jurisprudence, but imposing electoral burdens on the
basis of race was clearly unconstitutional.
III. SCHUETTE
At the very least, Schuette modifies electoral process guarantees
jurisprudence. It may in addition modify equal protection jurisprudence more generally, although that will depend upon whether some
of the approaches implicitly adopted in Schuette later receive explicit
endorsement by the Court. What is clear is that the Schuette approach involves a mode of analysis that is inconsistent with the previous jurisprudence. Subsequent cases will make clear how many
aspects of settled law have been changed.
A. Background Changes in Equal Protection Jurisprudence
To understand what Schuette is and is not doing, it is necessary to
appreciate some of the changes in equal protection jurisprudence that
have occurred since Reitman and Hunter were decided. At that time,
members of the Court were confident that they could discern whether
express consideration of race was invidious or, instead, benign.188
However, at least in part because of a change in attitude with respect
to whether members of the Court can discern which classifications are
invidious and which are not,189 the Court has modified its approach to
racial classification and will examine all such classifications with
strict scrutiny.190 At least one question raised by Schuette is whether
the Court has modified its approach yet again.191
State use of racial preferences in the context of education has itself
received much attention. The Court has made clear that whether on
the elementary or secondary school level on the one hand192 or on the
187. See supra notes 52–71, 125–30 and accompanying text.
188. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) (“[A]lthough the law on its face
treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is
that the law’s impact falls on the minority.”).
189. See Adarand Consts., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (“[D]espite the surface appeal of holding ‘benign’ racial classifications to a lower standard . . . ‘it may
not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign.’ ” (citing Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (plurality opinion))).
190. See id. at 224 (“[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification
subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial
scrutiny.”).
191. See infra notes 244–96 and accompanying text.
192. Parents Involved in Cmty Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 710 (2007)
(“The Seattle school district classifies children as white or nonwhite; the Jefferson County school district as black or ‘other.’ In Seattle, this racial classification
is used to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools. In Jefferson County, it is
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college193 or university194 level on the other, a state’s according racial
preferences in public education is only permissible if narrowly tailored
to promote compelling state interests.195
One of the reasons that it is important to understand that the
Court’s position has changed over the years with respect to the conditions under which the state can engage in race-conscious actions is
that some of the previously permissible remedies are no longer permissible. For example, the busing program that was the subject of the
referendum in Seattle would now be viewed as unconstitutional absent
a showing that the state had been involved in promoting the segregated conditions requiring a remedy.196 The Schuette plurality cautioned that “we must understand Seattle as Seattle understood itself,
as a case in which neither the State nor the United States ‘challenge[d] the propriety of race-conscious student assignments for the
purpose of achieving integration, even absent a finding of prior de jure
segregation.’”197 Indeed, the existing electoral process guarantees jurisprudence can only be understood in terms of some of the equal protection developments that have occurred since Seattle and Crawford
were decided,198 and it is only when Schuette is viewed in light of the
Court’s current equal protection jurisprudence that one can understand the respects in which Schuette has muddied the waters.

193.
194.

195.

196.

197.
198.

used to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule on transfer
requests.”).
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (“[R]acial ‘classifications are constitutional
only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.’ ”
(citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326)).
See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (“In order to satisfy this searching standard
of review, the school districts must demonstrate that the use of individual racial
classifications in the assignment plans here under review is ‘narrowly tailored’ to
achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.” (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227));
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (“To withstand our strict scrutiny analysis, respondents
must demonstrate that the University’s use of race in its current admissions program employs ‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests.’” citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227))); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“[A]ll
racial classifications imposed by government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny.’ This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.” (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227)).
See Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1633 (2014) (“[T]he [Seattle] school
board’s purported remedial action would not be permissible today absent a showing of de jure segregation.” (citing Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720–21)).
Id. (citing Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472 (1982)).
For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 117–66 and accompanying text.
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B. Schuette
At issue in Schuette was the following Michigan constitutional
amendment:
(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and any other public college or university, community college, or
school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.
(3) For the purposes of this section ‘state’ includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public college, university, or community college, school district, or other political subdivision or governmental
instrumentality of or within the State of Michigan not included in sub-section
1.199

The Court noted that the case was “not about the constitutionality,
or the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education,”200 reaffirming that “the consideration of race in admissions is
permissible, provided that certain conditions are met.”201 Instead,
what was at issue was “whether, and in what manner, voters in the
States may choose to prohibit the consideration of racial preferences
in governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.”202 Thus, Schuette did not address whether the Michigan electorate was permitted to incorporate within the state constitution a
prohibition that was already included within the Federal Constitution. Rather, the plurality addressed the permissibility of the electorate’s decision to include a prohibition within the state constitution of
some measures that are permissible under the United States
Constitution.203
The Schuette plurality traced the development of the electoral process guarantees jurisprudence, beginning with Reitman, explaining
that the Reitman Court had held that “the state constitutional provision was a denial of equal protection. . . . [It] [a]greed with the California Supreme Court that the amendment operated to insinuate the
State into the decision to discriminate by encouraging that practice.”204 After mentioning Justice Harlan’s Reitman dissent in which
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629.
Id. at 1630.
Id.
Id.
Justice Scalia implied that the remedies that were the subject of the referendum
were barely constitutionally permissible. See id. at 1639 (Scalia, J. concurring in
the judgment) (“Does the Equal Protection Clause forbid a State from banning a
practice that the Clause barely—and only provisionally—permits?”).
204. Id. at 1631 (majority opinion).
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he had argued that “California, by the action of its voters, simply
wanted the State to remain neutral in this area, so that the State was
not a party to discrimination,”205 the plurality commented that the
“dissenting voice did not prevail against the majority’s conclusion that
the state action in question encouraged discrimination, causing real
and specific injury.”206 While correct that Harlan’s dissent did not
win the day, the plurality’s noting Harlan’s claims about neutrality is
both regrettable and misleading, because the neutral position Harlan
was discussing was between preventing discrimination on the one
hand and promoting discrimination on the other. That factor has not
been one of the criteria in the developing electoral process guarantees
jurisprudence preceding Schuette, so it is at least curious that the plurality went out of its way to mention this claim about state neutrality.207 It may well be that the Schuette plurality’s failure to closely
attend to how Harlan’s point fits into the jurisprudence more generally helps illustrate how the plurality has changed the jurisprudence,
“unwittingly or otherwise.”208
The misdirection about the prevailing jurisprudence continued in
the Schuette plurality’s Hunter discussion: “Central to the Court’s reasoning in Hunter was that the charter amendment was enacted in circumstances where widespread racial discrimination in the sale and
rental of housing led to segregated housing, forcing many to live in
‘unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded conditions.’ ”209
While those conditions did provide the impetus for the Akron City
Council to take action, at least two points might be made to prevent
incorrect inferences about the role that those conditions played in the
constitutional analysis. First, the Hunter Court nowhere stated or implied that a different result would have been reached if the discrimination had been less widespread or if it had not resulted in those
unhealthy or unsanitary conditions. Second, the Hunter Court nowhere stated or implied that the creation of that need was in any way
attributable to the state.210
One of the militating factors in finding the Akron referendum constitutionally offensive was that it was unnecessary and went beyond
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Justice Scalia also claimed that Michigan had adopted a neutral position with
respect to race. See id. at 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he question in this
case, as in every case in which neutral state action is said to deny equal protection on account of race, is whether the action reflects a racially discriminatory
purpose.”).
208. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
209. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632 (citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
210. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (noting that the Akron ordinance
was designed to eradicate private discrimination).
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merely repealing the city council antidiscrimination measure.211 The
Schuette plurality emphasized that “the city charter amendment, by
singling out antidiscrimination ordinances, ‘places special burden on
racial minorities within the governmental process,’ thus becoming as
impermissible as any other government action taken with the invidious intent to injure a racial minority.”212 Characterizing Hunter in
this way permitted the plurality to conclude that “Hunter rests on the
unremarkable principle that the State may not alter the procedures of
government to target racial minorities.”213 Indeed, Reitman and
Hunter were summed up as standing for the proposition that “there
was a demonstrated injury on the basis of race that, by reasons of
state encouragement or participation, became more aggravated.”214
Yet, such a description might lead the reader to misunderstand what
was unconstitutional about the state action at issue in Hunter.
In the preamble to the open housing ordinance, the Akron City
Council had “recited that the population of Akron consists of ‘people of
different race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin, many of
whom live in circumscribed and segregated areas, under substandard
unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded conditions, because
of discrimination in the sale, lease, rental and financing of housing.’”215 Here, the Council was suggesting that minorities were being
forced to live in unhealthy and unsafe conditions because of the consistent refusal of the majority to sell lease, rent, or finance minority
housing. What was meant when the plurality suggested that it “is
against this background that the referendum required by § 137 must
be assessed?”216
First, it may be helpful to consider what would have been constitutionally permissible for the Akron electorate to have done. For example, the Hunter Court noted that local law provided that “measures
enacted by the council [may be] repealed through a referendum which
may be obtained on petition of 10% of the voters.”217 Suppose that the
electorate had merely repealed the council measure. In that event,
the protective measure would no longer be in place. The unhealthy
and unsafe living conditions for the Akron minority population would
continue, although the responsibility for that would be attributed to
private citizens rather than the state.
211. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632 (“[T]he charter amendment was unnecessary as a
general means of public control over the city council; for the people of Akron already were empowered to overturn ordinances by referendum.” (citing Hunter,
393 U.S. at 390, n.6)).
212. Id. (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 390 n.6.
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The Hunter Court noted that “Akron might have proceeded by majority vote at town meeting on all its municipal legislation, it has instead chosen a more complex system.”218 Presumably, Akron could
also have decided to require a majority vote at town meeting on all its
municipal legislation involving the sale, lease, or rental of housing.219
But Akron did not even do that.220 Instead, it only required ratification of housing antidiscrimination measures. The injury in Hunter
imposed by the State was not the unhealthy living conditions but, instead, having electoral burdens on certain groups seeking antidiscrimination measures.221 Further, the only evidence of the Akron
electorate’s having, in the words of the Schuette plurality, an “invidious intent to injure a racial minority”222 was in the electorate’s having
voted for required ratification for certain kinds of antidiscrimination
measures and in not having done so for other kinds of housing
measures.223
An analogous point might be made about Reitman. The California
Legislature had passed several acts that prohibited housing discrimination.224 The California Supreme Court had “conceded that the
State was permitted a neutral position with respect to private racial
discriminations and that the State was not bound by the Federal Constitution to forbid them.”225 This means that a mere repeal of the
housing discrimination acts would not have offended constitutional
218. Id. at 392–93.
219. Such a method would have been facially neutral. The question would be whether
the Court would have found that this was a clear attempt to bypass equal protection guarantees. But the Crawford reading of the pupil assignment/transportation measure at issue in Los Angeles, see supra notes 145–61 and accompanying
text, suggests that the Hunter Court might well not have read between the lines
when looking at such a facially neutral housing statute. See also supra notes
82–103 and accompanying text (discussing the James Court’s treatment of the
extra burden imposed on low-income housing).
220. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 (“The automatic referendum system does not reach
housing discrimination on sexual or political grounds, or against those with children or dogs, nor does it affect tenants seeking more heat or better maintenance
from landlords, nor those seeking rent control, urban renewal, public housing, or
new building codes.”).
221. See id. at 393 (“[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular group by
making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
person’s vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable size.” (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964))).
222. Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632 (2014).
223. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389–90; see also Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1663 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (“The Hunter Court was clear about why it invalidated the Akron
charter amendment: It was impermissible as a restructuring of the political process, not as an action motivated by discriminatory intent.” (citing Hunter, 393
U.S. at 391)).
224. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 374 (1967) (discussing the Unruh Act, the
Hawkins Act, and the Rumford Fair Housing Act).
225. Id. at 374–75.
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guarantees.226 But if that is so, then the injury imposed by the State
was not its having forced minorities to live in poor housing; instead,
the injury imposed by the state was in its having encouraged discrimination and “involv[ing] the State in private racial discriminations to
an unconstitutional degree.”227
While the referenda in both cases resulted in minorities being subject to discriminatory housing practices, those invidious practices
were performed by private citizens rather than the State. Because
those practices would presumably have taken place even had the state
merely repealed the protective legislation, the state’s discriminatory
action was not in its permitting the discrimination but in its doing
something in addition, either in encouraging private discrimination or
in imposing additional electoral burdens before antidiscrimination
measures could be implemented.
The Schuette plurality addressed Seattle, which was “best understood as a case in which the state action in question (the bar on busing
enacted by the State’s voters) had the serious risk, if not purpose, of
causing specific injuries on account of race, just as had been the case
in Mulkey [i.e., Reitman] and Hunter.”228 Although “there had been
no judicial finding of de jure segregation with respect to Seattle’s
school district,”229 the plurality noted that de jure segregation might
in fact have taken place.230
Ironically, when the Schuette plurality suggested that Seattle had
to be understood as the Seattle Court had understood it,231 the
Schuette plurality only focused on the Seattle Court’s willingness to
countenance ordered busing even absent a finding of de jure discrimination,232 not on the Seattle Court’s understanding of the prevailing
electoral process jurisprudence. But that myopic focus prevented the
Schuette plurality from seeing how the Seattle approach, understood
226. See id. at 376 (“[A]s we understand the California court, it did not posit a constitutional violation on the mere repeal of the Unruh and Rumford Acts. It did not
read either our cases or the Fourteenth Amendment as establishing an automatic
constitutional barrier to the repeal of an existing law prohibiting racial discriminations in housing; nor did the court rule that a State may never put in statutory
form an existing policy of neutrality with respect to private discriminations.”).
227. Id. at 378–79.
228. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633.
229. Id.
230. See id. (“[I]t appears as though school segregation in the district in the 1940’s and
1950’s may have been the partial result of school board policies that ‘permitted
white students to transfer out of black schools while restricting the transfer of
black students into white schools.’ ” (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 807–08 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting))).
231. Id. (citing Washington vs. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472 n.15).
232. See id.
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in light of the current interpretation of equal protection guarantees,
establishes the Michigan amendment’s unconstitutionality.233
The Schuette plurality focused on language in the Seattle opinion
suggesting that “where a government policy ‘inures primarily to the
benefit of the minority’ and ‘minorities . . . consider’ the policy to be ‘in
their interest,’ then any state action that ‘place[s] effective decisionmaking authority over’ that policy ‘at a different level of government’
must be reviewed under strict scrutiny.”234 This was interpreted to
mean that “any state action with a ‘racial focus’ that makes it ‘more
difficult for certain racial minorities than for other groups’ to ‘achieve
legislation that is in their interest’ is subject to strict scrutiny.”235
But such a broad reading was rejected as incompatible with current
constitutional guarantees,236 at least in part, because of the Court’s
current unwillingness to decide which policies promote minority interests.237 The plurality explained: “To the extent Seattle is read to require the Court to determine and declare which political policies serve
the ‘interest’ of a group defined in racial terms, that rationale was unnecessary to the decision in Seattle . . . [and] raises serious constitutional concerns.”238 Such “expansive language does not provide a
proper guide for decisions and should not be deemed authoritative or
controlling.”239
One reason that such a view must be rejected is that it “cannot be
entertained as a serious proposition that all individuals of the same
race think alike.”240 Thus, something viewed by one individual as
promoting minority interests might be viewed by another individual
as undermining those same interests. Perhaps one could poll minority
members to find out whether they were generally supportive of a particular policy,241 although that would require some method of deter-

233.
234.
235.
236.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See infra notes 234–96 and accompanying text.
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472, 474).
Id. (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472, 474).
Id. (“It is this reading of Seattle that the Court of Appeals found to be controlling
here. And that reading must be rejected.”); see also id. (“The expansive reading of
Seattle has no principled limitation and raises serious questions of compatibility
with the Court’s settled equal protection jurisprudence.”).
See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634.
Id.
Id.
Cf. Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 711 n.66
(1999) (reviewing WILLIAM G. BOWEN AND DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS (Princeton University Press 1998)) (“[P]olls have long indicated that
as a group, African-Americans tend to support affirmative action policies.”).
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mining which individuals belong to which race, which itself is
problematic.242
The difficulty here is not in the plurality’s pointing out that the
Seattle view concerning what is constitutionally permissible is incompatible with the current approach to equal protection jurisprudence,
but in the implications to be drawn from that point. The Schuette plurality implies that the difference between the Seattle view and the current view requires reversal of the Sixth Circuit decision, whereas in
fact the Sixth Circuit opinion better accounts for the jurisprudence
that prevailed until Schuette was issued.243
Precisely because equal protection jurisprudence no longer permits
courts to attempt to distinguish between beneficial and invidious racial classifications, all racial classification must be examined with
strict scrutiny.244 Because that is so, there is no need for a court to
determine if a particular program is beneficial for or harmful to minorities—the program will only be upheld if it passes muster under
strict scrutiny.
How should the Reitman-Hunter-Seattle line of cases be understood in light of the current interpretation of equal protection guarantees? Where members of a particular discrete and insular class (race
is a paradigmatic example) are subject to extra electoral burdens
before they can secure a change in the law, those electoral burdens
will be struck down unless narrowly tailored to promote compelling
state interests. The Court has rejected the Seattle approach that took
into account whether the challenged legislation involved matters that
inured to the benefit of the minority.245 But the current approach,
which rejects employing a lower level of scrutiny for programs benefiting minorities, increases rather than decreases the kinds of race-based
classifications subject to strict scrutiny, because preferential programs that might previously have triggered intermediate scrutiny246
now will trigger strict scrutiny.
242. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (“And if it were deemed necessary to probe how some
races define their own interest in political matters, still another beginning point
would be to define individuals according to race.”); see also id. at 1635–36 (“But a
number of problems raised by Seattle, such as racial definitions, still apply.”).
243. See infra notes 244–303 and accompanying text.
244. Adarand Constrs. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
245. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634.
246. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 564–65 (1990) (“We hold
that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress—even if those measures are not ‘remedial’ in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of
past governmental or societal discrimination—are constitutionally permissible to
the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power of
Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”), overruled by Adarand Constrs., 515 U.S. at 227.

2015]

ELECTORAL PROCESS GUARANTEES

91

Suppose that the Michigan amendment had required using raceconscious criteria in admissions even when there was no compelling
need to do so. In that event, the plurality’s discussion of whether raceconscious remedies are permissible absent a showing of invidious
state action would have been relevant. But the Michigan amendment
did not advocate the use of race-conscious measures even when the
Federal Constitution barred their use. On the contrary, the Michigan
amendment precluded the use of race-conscious measures even when
the Federal Constitution permitted their use. Ironically, the Michigan
amendment included an express racial classification, which should
have been examined with strict scrutiny. It simply is not relevant
whether, as Chief Justice Roberts believes, racial “preferences do
more harm than good.”247 The current jurisprudence does not permit
the courts to act differently even if they believe that an express racial
classification would be beneficial.
Why did the plurality fail to examine the Michigan amendment
with strict scrutiny? That explanation requires consideration of another way in which the plurality modified the existing jurisprudence.
The plurality explained that because “there was no infliction of a specific injury of the kind at issue in Mulkey and Hunter and in the history of the Seattle schools,”248 the electoral process jurisprudence was
inapplicable to the Michigan referendum. The Michigan referendum
instead involved “the right of Michigan voters to determine that racebased preferences granted by Michigan governmental entities should
be ended.”249
There are two distinct reasons that the plurality’s analysis is unpersuasive. First, the injury at issue in Schuette is of the same kind as
the injuries at issue in Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle. While Reitman
and Hunter both involved antidiscrimination measures that had been
repealed, the injury was not in the repeal of those measures, since a
mere repeal would have been permissible.250 Nor was it in the invidious denial of housing, since that would have been done by private individuals. Rather, the invidious harm imposed by the state was in its
imposition of extra electoral burdens on the basis of race.
Suppose that the Schuette plurality’s recommendation is followed251 and the issues in Seattle are understood as the Seattle Court
itself understood them. The injury was not in being forced to attend
segregated schools, since that de facto segregation was attributed to
247.
248.
249.
250.

Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1639 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 1636.
Id. at 1635.
See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967) (noting that “the [mere] repeal of any statute prohibiting racial discrimination . . . is constitutionally permissible”); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 n.5 (1968) (“[W]e do not hold
that mere repeal of an existing ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment”).
251. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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private rather than state action.252 The injury was in having increased electoral burdens imposed with respect to matters of a racial
nature. But Schuette also involved the imposition of electoral burdens
on matters of a racial nature.253 Further, it does not matter whether
permitting minority preferences is thought to advance minority interests, because creating more opportunity,254 or instead to undermine
minority interests, because causing some to undervalue or underestimate the degree to which minorities succeed on the “merits.”255 Either way, the classification triggers strict scrutiny.
When distinguishing between the type of injury at issue in Reitman and Hunter and the type of benefit at issue in Schuette, the plurality seemed to contrast specific harms on the one hand and mere
preferences on the other.256 The plurality suggested that those who
gain by virtue of a preference are merely being accorded a benefit on a
basis other than its having been deserved or earned. Yet, the clear
distinction between harm and benefit has been especially slippery in
the context of school admissions.
Consider an individual, Jones, who is competing for one of a limited number of spots in a first-year class at a state university. Jones is
denied admission. Suppose that someone else, Smith, is offered a
place in the first-year class. Has Jones been injured by Smith’s having been admitted? That is unclear, because Jones might have been
denied admission even if Smith had not been offered that spot. Suppose further that Smith is a member of a racial minority and Jones is
252. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1642 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The
[Seattle] opinion assumes throughout that Seattle’s schools suffered at most from
de facto segregation.”); id. at 1664 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plurality
might prefer that the Seattle Court had said that, but it plainly did not. Not once
did the Court suggest the presence of de jure segregation in Seattle. Quite the
opposite: The opinion explicitly suggested the desegregation plan was adopted to
remedy de facto rather than de jure segregation.” (citing Washington v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472, n.15 (1982))).
253. See id. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are now two very different
processes through which a Michigan citizen is permitted to influence the admissions policies of the State’s universities: one for persons interested in race-sensitive admissions policies and one for everyone else.”).
254. See Lorin J. Lapidus, Diversity’s Divergence: A Post-Grutter Examination of Racial Preferences in Public Employment, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 199, 204 (2006)
(“Racial preferences were seen as a way to level the field of competition and create new educational opportunities for minorities.”).
255. Cf. Adarand Constrs. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (“These programs stamp minorities with a
badge of inferiority.”).
256. Cf. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637 (majority opinion) (discussing “the well-established principle that when hurt or injury is inflicted on racial minorities by the
encouragement or command of laws or other state action, the Constitution requires redress by the courts” (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511–12
(2005))).
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not. Has Jones been injured? It is still true that Jones might not
have gotten the spot, even if Smith had also been denied admission.257
Suppose that Smith and Jones are applying to a state university
that places an inordinate weight on race in its admissions decisions.258 The Court would likely say that Jones had been injured in
the sense that he had been denied the opportunity to compete without
having racial factors play an inappropriate role, even if Jones could
not establish that he had been denied a spot that he otherwise would
have gotten. As the Court explained in Northeastern Florida Chapter
of Associated General Contractors of America v. City of
Jacksonville:259
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a
member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege
that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish standing. The “injury in fact” in an equal protection case of this variety is
the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not
the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.260

The amendment at issue in Schuette is vulnerable under the Jacksonville analysis because “the denial of equal treatment resulting from
the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the
benefit,”261 is what makes the amendment unconstitutional. Thus,
because the state constitutional amendment makes it more difficult
for members of racial groups than members of other groups to obtain a
benefit that the Federal Constitution permits them to obtain, the
amendment does not pass muster. But the plurality obviously had a
much different understanding of the amendment’s constitutionality,
notwithstanding the plurality’s admission that “race was an undoubted subject of the ballot issue.”262
Why wasn’t the amendment subjected to strict scrutiny? Part of
the explanation is likely that the plurality did not believe the amend257. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1078 (2002) (“In any highly selective
competition where white applicants greatly outnumber minority applicants, and
where multiple objective and nonobjective criteria are relevant, the average
white applicant will not fare significantly worse under a selection process that is
race-conscious than under a process that is race-neutral.”).
258. Cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 274 (2003) (striking down an admissions
policy because it made “race a decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant”).
259. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
260. Id. at 666; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. at 719 (“As we have held, one form of injury under the Equal Protection
Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may prejudice the
plaintiff.”).
261. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666.
262. Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1635 (2014).
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ment invidiously motivated263 but, instead, adopted to reduce
divisiveness.264
The electorate’s instruction to governmental entities not to embark upon the
course of race-defined and race-based preferences was adopted, we must assume, because the voters deemed a preference system to be unwise, on account of what voters may deem its latent potential to become itself a source of
the very resentments and hostilities based on race that this Nation seeks to
put behind it.265

Unwilling to presume bias on the electorate’s part,266 the plurality
believed its position consistent with preventing injury to minority interests.267 “What is at stake here is not whether injury will be inflicted but whether government can be instructed not to follow a
course that entails, first, the definition of racial categories and, second, the grant of favored status to persons in some racial categories
and not others.”268
Yet, at least two points must be made. First, the amendment itself
expressly employs a racial classification, so the plurality’s point about
the importance of avoiding the need to define racial categories is not
supported by the opinion. Racial categories were put into play by the
amendment itself,269 so the plurality should not pretend that the responsibility for creating the need to define racial categories should be
laid at the feet of those challenging the amendment. Thus, going forward, it will be difficult to avoid the problems inherent in defining
racial categories if only because such definitions will be required in
order to know what the amendment precludes. Second, the plurality’s
worry about favoring some racial classes over others is already addressed by the prevailing equal protection jurisprudence, because racial preferences cannot be accorded unless surviving review under
strict scrutiny.270 As the Court explained in Johnson v. California,271
“We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called
263. Cf. id. at 1637 (“It is demeaning to the democratic process to presume that the
voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.”).
264. Id. at 1635 (“Racial division would be validated, not discouraged, were the Seattle
formulation, and the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this case, to remain in
force.”).
265. Id. at 1638.
266. Id. at 1637.
267. Id. (“These precepts are not inconsistent with the well-established principle that
when hurt or injury is inflicted on racial minorities by the encouragement or command of laws or other state action, the Constitution requires redress by the
courts.” (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511–12 (2005))).
268. Id. at 1638.
269. See id. at 1629.
270. Cf. id. at 1630 (suggesting that this decision follows Fisher, which “did not disturb the principle that the consideration of race in admissions is permissible, provided that certain conditions are met”).
271. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
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‘benign’ racial classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions policies.”272
C. On Neutrality
Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment may make
something explicit that implicitly undergirds the Schuette plurality
opinion, namely, why the Michigan amendment is “neutral,” notwithstanding its expressly precluding according preferences on the basis of
race. He criticized both the Schuette plurality and the Schuette dissent because, allegedly, “each endorses a version of the proposition
that a facially neutral law may deny equal protection solely because it
has a disparate racial impact.”273 Justice Scalia chides the other
members of the Court for not having paid close enough attention to
Crawford, decided the same day as Seattle, which affirms the following principle: “[E]ven when a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial minority, the Fourteenth Amendment is
violated only if a discriminatory purpose can be shown.”274
How is it that an amendment expressly employing the term “race”
can nonetheless be neutral? Justice Scalia explained that a “law that
‘neither says nor implies that persons are to be treated differently on
account of their race’ is not a racial classification,” citing Crawford.275
Why? Because “statutes mandating equal treatment”276 preclude
treating individuals differently on account of race. Basically, by
prohibiting both discrimination and according preferences, there is a
sense in which the state is requiring that race be treated “neutrally.”
The question then becomes whether this sense of neutrality is the
sense of neutrality currently required by the Constitution. First,
though, it is important to see why Justice Scalia is misrepresenting
Crawford. Crawford explained that the proposition at issue in that
case “neither says nor implies that persons are to be treated differently on account of their race.”277 To what was the Crawford proposition being compared? To the propositions at issue in Hunter and in
Seattle. The Hunter proposition expressly classified on the basis of
race—“there was an explicitly racial classification treating racial
housing matters differently from other racial and housing matters.”278
The Seattle proposition did not expressly discriminate on the basis of
race, but the Court found that it implicitly discriminated, because the
ordinance “use[d] the racial nature of an issue to define the govern272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 505 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)).
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1647 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. (citing Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of City of L.A., 458 U.S. 527, 537–38 (1982)).
Id. at 1648 (citing Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537.
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 389 (1969).
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mental decisionmaking structure, and thus impose[d] substantial and
unique burdens on racial minorities.279 Because Crawford neither expressly nor implicitly targeted race, the amendment was upheld.
However, the Crawford Court made clear that “if Proposition I [had]
employed a racial classification it would be unconstitutional unless
necessary to further a compelling state interest.”280 But the Schuette
plurality admitted that race was a subject of the amendment,281
which should have triggered strict scrutiny according to both Seattle
and Crawford.282
Suppose that the Michigan amendment had simply said that no
preferences could be accorded on the basis of race or sex. Would such
an amendment have been neutral? Presumably, it would not be
thought as neutral as an amendment precluding both invidious discrimination and preferences, because the latter but not the former is
neutral between hindering and helping.283 But the Michigan amendment was not neutral between hindering and helping in that sense
because the hindering it precluded was already precluded anyway, so
its only effect was to preclude according preferences on the basis of
race.
Consider the Akron referendum:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates
the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or
financing of real property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a
majority of the electors voting on the question at a regular or general election
before said ordinance shall be effective.284

This ordinance is neutral in the sense that it would apply to all
housing measures targeting race, whether trying to promote or prevent discrimination. Yet, the Hunter Court did not characterize this
ordinance as race-neutral but, instead, as targeting on the basis of
race.285 When considering whether an amendment is neutral, it may
be helpful to consider the context in which an amendment is passed.
The Hunter Court treated this “neutral” treatment of race as disadvantaging minorities because it understood that the amendment
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982).
Crawford, 458 U.S. at 536.
See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1635.
See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470; Crawford, 458 U.S. at 536.
Cf. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Proposition 209 provides that the State of California shall not discriminate against, or
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race or
gender. Rather than classifying individuals by race or gender, Proposition 209
prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender. A law that
prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or gender a fortiori does
not classify individuals by race or gender.”).
284. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 387 (1969).
285. Id. at 389.
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had been adopted in response to the Akron City Council’s passage of
an antidiscrimination measure. The Court noted that the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes state discrimination on the basis of race,286 so
the City Council could not have adopted measures that encouraged
racial discrimination without offending equal protection guarantees
contained in the Federal Constitution.287 But given the context in
which the amendment was passed—invidious discrimination was already prohibited by the Federal Constitution in any event—the Proposition would not have been thought more “neutral” even were it to
have precluded the City Council from doing something that the Federal Constitution prohibited the council from doing anyway.288
Analogous reasoning should be applied to the Michigan amendment, which was passed in response to the Court’s upholding racial
preferences in University admissions under certain circumstances.289
Just as the Akron amendment was aimed at making it more difficult
for minorities to secure certain benefits, the Michigan amendment
was as well. Further, when precluding discrimination
“against . . . individuals or groups on the basis of race,”290 the Michigan amendment was presumably merely precluding what the Federal
Constitution already precludes.291 But that means that the Michigan
amendment should be treated as if it had merely precluded affording
racial preferences without in addition precluding racial
discrimination.
Perhaps an amendment precluding racial preferences might also
be viewed as neutral within the category of race in the sense that no
race can be preferred over any other.292 But Hunter was facially neutral with respect to the differing groups composing the category of
race, and the Court had no difficulty in subjecting that referendum to
286. Id. at 391 (“[T]he core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified official distinctions based on race . . . .”).
287. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378–79 (1967).
288. Lest it be thought that the City Council was merely prohibiting what state law
prohibited, the Court noted that that, unlike the state law, the local antidiscrimination measure did not merely target commercial housing. See Hunter, 393
U.S. at 389 n.3.
289. David E. Bernstein, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and the
Failed Attempt to Square a Circle, 8 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 210, 211 (2013) (“The
amendment was a reaction to the Supreme Court’s decisions on the constitutionality of affirmative action preferences in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. University of Michigan in 2003.”).
290. Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014) (quoting the text of the
amendment).
291. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150–51 (1970) (“Few principles of
law are more firmly stitched into our constitutional fabric than the proposition
that a State must not discriminate against a person because of his race.”).
292. Cf. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638 (“What is at stake here is . . . the grant of favored
status to persons in some racial categories and not others.”).
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close scrutiny because of its presumed impact on racial minorities.293
Whether or not the Schuette plurality believed that the Michigan
amendment was designed to preclude benefiting minorities,294 the
amendment clearly focused on race to the exclusion of other possible
points of focus.
When discussing neutrality, one might be concerned about neutrality within a category or neutrality across categories. The Hunter
Court noted that the Akron ordinance “disadvantages those who
would benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations as against those who would bar other discriminations or who
would otherwise regulate the real estate market in their favor.”295
The Court explained that other kinds of private discrimination could
be precluded by the City Council without requiring electoral ratification.296 But an analogous analysis should be made regarding the
Michigan amendment, which requires a constitutional amendment
(i.e., one that would repeal the amendment that had been passed banning racial preferences) in order for certain kinds of preferences to be
accorded, but does not impose such a requirement with respect to
other kinds of preferences, e.g., with respect to legacy candidates or
candidates preferred because they are from underrepresented geographical locations. Schuette is simply irreconcilable with the Hunter
line of cases insofar as that line precludes imposing greater electoral
burdens on the category of race than are imposed upon other
categories.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Schuette plurality sought to provide a kind of compromise position in that it did not wish to hold that racial classifications are per se
invalid,297 as Justice Scalia presumably would have held.298 For that,
293.
294.
295.
296.

Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393.
See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
See id. (“The automatic referendum system does not reach housing discrimination on sexual or political grounds, or against those with children or dogs, nor
does it affect tenants seeking more heat or better maintenance from landlords,
nor those seeking rent control, urban renewal, public housing, or new building
codes.”).
297. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630 (“[I]t is important to note what this case is not about.
It is not about the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions
policies in higher education. The consideration of race in admissions presents
complex questions, in part addressed last Term in Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). In Fisher, the Court did not disturb the principle
that the consideration of race in admissions is permissible, provided that certain
conditions are met.”).
298. Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Does the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbid what its text plainly requires?”).
Here, Justice Scalia was suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment requires

2015]

ELECTORAL PROCESS GUARANTEES

99

it should be applauded. But the costs incurred by adopting this compromise position should not be ignored. First, the plurality claims to
have applied the Hunter-Seattle Doctrine, but did so in a way that is
unfathomable. While resisting Justice Scalia’s call to overrule the
doctrine,299 the plurality applied a doctrine without explaining what
it is or how it works. Certainly, Hunter’s striking down a referendum
because electoral burdens were placed on the basis of race when other
classifications were not so encumbered is difficult, if not impossible, to
reconcile with the Schuette approach.
Implicit in Schuette is that a law that prohibits both preferential
and detrimental treatment of the basis of race is race-neutral, since
otherwise the Michigan amendment would have been subjected to
strict scrutiny. But this understanding of neutrality focuses on evenhandedness within a category without even considering evenhandedness across categories. Such an approach makes no sense in the
context of electoral process guarantees jurisprudence, because the focus of that jurisprudence has been on whether electoral burdens have
been imposed upon a discrete and insular class (paradigmatically
race) that has not been imposed on other classes300—the focus has
been on treatment across classes rather than within a class.
If Justice Scalia were correct that states are prohibited from imposing benefits or burdens on the basis of race,301 then the Michigan
amendment would be constitutional—it would simply be including requirements within the state constitution that are already required
within the Federal Constitution. But the Schuette plurality reaffirmed that racial preferences can be constitutional,302 i.e., if narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling state interest.303 But one must wonder what compelling state interest would be promoted by prohibiting a
policy that itself was narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state
interest (as a policy affording racial preferences would have to be in
order for such a policy to pass constitutional muster).

299.
300.

301.

302.
303.

states to be race-neutral, i.e., afford neither benefits nor burdens on the basis of
race. Cf. id. at 1648 (“As Justice Harlan observed over a century ago, “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”
(citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
Id. at 1643 (“Patently atextual, unadministrable, and contrary to our traditional
equal-protection jurisprudence, Hunter and Seattle should be overruled.”).
See, e.g., Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390–91 (“But § 137 nevertheless disadvantages
those who would benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations as against those who would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise regulate the real estate market in their favor.”).
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Does the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbid what its text
plainly requires?”).
Id. at 1630.
See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
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Current equal protection jurisprudence requires that whenever the
state classifies on the basis of race, regardless of motivation, the classification must be examined with strict scrutiny. Up until Schuette,
that had meant that employing a racial classification in a way that
would affect the ability to secure benefits would itself trigger strict
scrutiny. But Schuette undermines that understanding, and it is now
an open question whether there will be additional contexts in which
the use of race in a way that affects the distribution of benefits and
burdens will nonetheless not trigger strict scrutiny.
Schuette is regrettable for a number of reasons including that it
muddles electoral process guarantees jurisprudence and, perhaps,
equal protection jurisprudence as well. At a time when the Court has
doubted its own ability to discern whether racial classifications help or
hurt minorities and thus has required that all such classifications be
subjected to strict scrutiny, the Schuette plurality has nonetheless created an exception to that rule. States are permitted to ban narrowly
tailored programs benefiting racial minorities without triggering the
kind of scrutiny normally associated with programs targeting on the
basis of race. Such an exception cannot help but reinforce the view of
some that the Court is reneging on its commitment to promote racial
justice and fairness,304 protestations to the contrary notwithstanding,305 and the Court must do something to dispel the suspicions that
Schuette is almost certain to aggravate.

304. Cf. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1654 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The plurality’s decision fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the injustice worked by § 26.”).
305. Cf. id. at 1639 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“People can disagree in good faith on
this issue, but it similarly does more harm than good to question the openness
and candor of those on either side of the debate.”).

